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TAB A

19 April 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

FROM : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Economic Intelligence Committee

1. The action proposed in this report is in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the memorandum of March 3, 1950, from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council to the Director of Central Intelligence (Appendix A). This memorandum requires the study of economic security intelligence requirements and facilities throughout the Government and the formulation of a comprehensive plan for satisfying the foreign economic intelligence requirements of national security and for coordinated interagency effort to this end.

2. The Problem - Foreign economic data are now regularly collected and analyzed by some twenty-four agencies of the Government. The nature of such data, the facilities for collection and analysis, and the purposes for which they are sought and used are summarized in Appendix C. This diverse flow of information has been generated to meet the operating or other responsibilities of these several agencies. Much of this information and analytic competence is relevant to one economic aspect or another of national security. Present methods do not adequately provide for the mobilization of the available data and analytic competence around security problems.

3. The first aim of the proposed plan is, therefore, to ensure regular procedures whereby the full knowledge and technical talent of the

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Government can be brought to bear on specific issues involving the national security. The character of these issues is discussed and illustrated in Appendix B.

4. Despite the number of agencies concerned, and the scale of the flow of intelligence data, there are important gaps in the collective knowledge of the Government. Such gaps arise in part from the lack of regular procedures for identifying and filling them, on a high priority basis, through the various existing channels for collection and analysis. The second main aim of the proposed plan is, therefore, to institute procedures for filling the most important of these gaps in our knowledge.

5. One way of approaching the task of preparing a comprehensive plan, as directed by the National Security Council, would be to try to divide the problems and the data into broad categories and to propose a general allocation of responsibility for each category of problem or type of data to a particular agency. It is believed that a formal allocation of responsibility of this kind is neither desirable nor practical at this time, for the following reasons:

(a) General responsibility for the production of economic intelligence cannot be assigned to any one agency since virtually all the agencies now producing such intelligence have an operating need for it in the discharge of their central mission.

(b) As will be evident from an inspection of Appendix B, responsibility cannot be permanently allocated on the basis of the

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problems to be solved, since (1) the problems are continually changing with changes in the international scene; and (2) most of the important problems requiring economic intelligence for their solution are of direct operating concern to two or more agencies.

(c) Formal allocation cannot be made on the basis of skills required or techniques to be employed since in virtually every case more than one agency requires, for its own purposes, people with the particular skill in question.

6. Therefore, what is needed is a continuing machinery for insuring that the available economic intelligence resources are mobilized around security issues, problem by problem, and that where adequate economic intelligence on a particular security issue is not being provided by any agency, responsibility for its provision will be clearly allocated.

7. In the light of these considerations, it is proposed that a committee be established whose principal duty it would be to bring to bear, on concrete, major security issues, the combined economic intelligence resources of the Government. In the course of such selected and concerted studies it is proposed that explicit attention be given to:

- (a) Major gaps and weaknesses in data and analysis
- (b) How these defects should be remedied
- (c) Who should have responsibility for the required action.

Effective coordination among the agencies concerned can only be achieved by collective common effort, focussed on practical and urgent problems.

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8. The gravest threat to the security of the United States and to the whole free world within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR and from the nature of the Soviet system. It is proposed, therefore, that the first critical studies to be carried out should relate to major aspects of the problem of strengthening the relative position of the non-Soviet world in the struggle against the Soviet bloc. Appendix B includes by way of illustration a discussion of various problems of this character, which might be suitable for such combined, critical study.

9. Recommendations - In the light of the above, approval of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is requested for the following action:

(a) The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish an Economic Intelligence Committee, on which shall permanently sit representatives of those agencies charged with primary responsibility for national security intelligence, i.e. the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Any other agency whose interest or competence may be relevant to the particular problem under examination may be invited also to sit with the Economic Intelligence Committee.

(b) The Assistant Director, Office of Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency, shall serve as Chairman of the Economic Intelligence Committee, and he shall supply the secretariat.

(c) The Economic Intelligence Committee shall:

(1) Maintain a continuing review of the foreign economic intelligence activities of the United States Government as they relate to the national security.

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(2) Arrange concerted economic intelligence support, on selected major issues, for studies of interagency interest requested by the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.

(3) Mobilize the data and analysis available, relevant to appropriate operating problems of any member agency requesting assistance, or of any other agency dealing with economic security problems, which may request assistance.

(4) Review and report, from time to time, on the pertinence, extent, and quality of the data and analyses available, bearing on the issues analyzed, with recommendations to the Intelligence Advisory Committee concerning the means and the agency by which gaps might be filled.

(5) Make such special reviews of economic intelligence distribution and processing procedures as may appear useful, and make recommendations for improvement to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, which shall have responsibility for instituting such action as it may judge appropriate.

(6) Examine continuing programs of basic economic research relating to the national security throughout the United States Government and recommend allocation of responsibility for specific fields of inquiry where such allocation appears appropriate.

(d) In carrying out its responsibilities the Economic Intelligence Committee may set up such subcommittees and working parties as may be judged necessary.

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(e) In the establishment of priorities and allocation of responsibilities for the collection and analysis to fill specific gaps in the economic intelligence needed for national security, the decisions of the Economic Intelligence Committee with regard to such intelligence, shall govern the activities of the IAC agencies in the same manner as decisions of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Disagreements as to priorities and allocations may be referred to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Where disagreements arise with respect to the activities of non-IAC agencies, the Intelligence Advisory Committee may refer these to the National Security Council."

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APPENDIX A

TEXT OF NSC ACTION 282

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Appraisal of Foreign Economic Intelligence Requirements,  
Facilities and Arrangements Related to the National  
Security

REFERENCE: Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject,  
dated February 7, 1950

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury,  
and the Attorney General have approved the proposal by the Acting  
Chairman, National Security Resources Board, contained in the next-  
to-the-last paragraph of the enclosure to the reference memorandum  
on the subject.

The National Security Council accordingly directs the Central  
Intelligence Agency, in collaboration with the government agencies  
concerned:

1. To organize and conduct a study of
  - a. foreign economic intelligence requirements relating  
to the national security, including requirements for mobilization  
planning;
  - b. facilities and arrangements currently employed for  
meeting those requirements;
  - c. the adequacy of such facilities and arrangements; and,  
where appropriate, means for their improvement.
2. Based on the findings of this study, to prepare for Council  
consideration and action a comprehensive plan for satisfying the  
foreign economic intelligence requirements of the national security  
and for a coordinated interagency effort to this end based on a  
definite allocation of responsibilities among the agencies concerned.

(Signed)  
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.  
Executive Secretary



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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

2 February 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Appraisal of Foreign Economic Intelligence Requirements, Facilities and Arrangements Related to the National Security

As resources mobilization planning progresses, it is increasingly evident to the participating agencies that the full effectiveness of many segments of such planning depends upon the ready availability of adequate, timely and correlated foreign economic intelligence.

This has proved, for example, to be the case in such fields as peacetime procurement and development for stockpiling; wartime procurement and development; foreign manpower; war trade agreements; export and import controls; economic assistance to potential allies and friendly neutrals, and other foreign requirements; preclusive buying; proclaimed listing; the control of foreign assets; economic capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential allies, neutral and enemy nations.

From the experience of the agencies associated in mobilization planning in recent months, it is now feasible to determine more clearly than previously the foreign economic intelligence requirements for further planning. Many of the studies completed or under way also provide a better means than previously available of testing the adequacy of current intelligence efforts. In the light of these developments, more effective evaluation of foreign economic intelligence for mobilization planning can now be made.

Another field where foreign economic intelligence is vital is that of the formulation of current policies and programs relating to the national security. Members of the National Security Council will readily appreciate the value of constantly seeking to improve the foreign economic intelligence relating to proposals considered by the council.

Intelligence activities with regard to mobilization planning and to current security policies and programs are intricately interrelated and at many points indistinguishable. Therefore, much can be said for covering both fields in a single undertaking.

Accordingly, the time seems opportune to reappraise our foreign economic intelligence requirements, facilities and arrangements as they relate to the national security, including mobilization planning. Such an appraisal would require central direction with appropriate interagency collaboration.

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It is, therefore, proposed that the National Security Council direct the CIA, in collaboration with the Government agencies concerned:

1. To organize and conduct a study of
  - a. foreign economic intelligence requirements relating to the national security, including requirements for mobilization planning;
  - b. facilities and arrangements currently employed for meeting those requirements;
  - c. the adequacy of such facilities and arrangements; and where appropriate, means for their improvement.
2. Based on the findings of this study, to prepare for Council consideration and action a comprehensive plan for satisfying the foreign economic intelligence requirements of the national security and for a coordinated interagency effort to this end based on a definite allocation of responsibilities among the agencies concerned.

The staff of the NSRB has much information which would be of help in this undertaking, and will be available to assist in liaison and consultant capacities.

/s/ JOHN R. STEELMAN  
JOHN R. STEELMAN

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APPENDIX B

FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS  
RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

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APPENDIX B

FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS  
RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

I. Functions of Foreign Economic Intelligence as it Relates to the Security of the United States

A. The primary function of foreign economic intelligence in the service of national security is to provide the basis for United States policy formulation and action by: (1) providing a factual and objective analysis of the economic situation in foreign countries as it affects the interests of the United States; (2) determining probable future developments of concern to the United States through analysis of economic factors; and (3) assisting, on the basis of economic evidence, in determining the feasibility and probable consequences of alternative courses of action open to the United States.

B. A great many agencies of the United States Government in the discharge of their own special missions collect economic information and perform economic research concerning foreign countries.<sup>1/</sup> Virtually all of this information and research is or may be relevant to one or another specific problem of national security. It is the primary duty of the agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee to see to it that data collected and analyzed for many purposes is brought to bear on national security problems, and that such additional information is collected and analyzed as may be necessary to furnish the answers to critical security problems.

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<sup>1/</sup> A survey of the nature and extent of such economic intelligence is included in this report as Appendix C.

Accordingly this paper, while recognizing the need for the fullest interchange among all interested parties, concentrates its attention on the requirements of the IAC agencies for economic intelligence relating to the national security.

C. In order to determine how the relatively limited economic intelligence facilities, both within and outside the Government, can make their maximum contribution, and in what directions their efforts most need to be augmented, it is necessary that there be established and maintained machinery for combined economic intelligence analysis on a priority basis. Such machinery is recommended elsewhere in this report. The purpose of this statement of requirements is to suggest the perspective in which a continuing program of priority intelligence problems might be viewed.

D. Such a program must include:

(1) Defining authoritatively the economic reports most needed in support of United States national security policies and actions.

(2) Determining the particular economic research studies, of an ad hoc or continuing character, most urgent and essential as a basis for the reports listed in (1) above.

(3) Organizing the requisite economic reports and research studies, including the allocation of tasks among the various interested and competent agencies and the merging of the results of individual analyses.

(4) Defining and arranging for the collection of the economic information, not already available in the government, which is most essential to the preparation of the estimates and research studies listed in (1) and (2) above.

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(5) Reviewing the processing facilities (translation facilities, industrial registers, document indexing, map production, etc.) and the techniques of analysis needed to exploit raw intelligence materials most effectively.

The following section (Section II) attempts a classification of the reports and studies needed primarily for government policy and planning purposes. Some of these might form the basis for National Intelligence Estimates or might be combined with other factors to support National Intelligence Estimates of a wider scope. Section III outlines the categories of operational intelligence interest which must be covered by one or more of the intelligence agencies on a continuing or ad hoc basis.

The outline of research and information requirements must be designed to support the intelligence studies outlined in Sections II and III, and will, in part, grow out of these studies as they progress. Some suggestions are made in Section IV as to the facilities and techniques required.

## II. Foreign Economic Reports and Estimates Most Needed in Support of National Security Plans and Policies

### A. Introduction

The gravest threat to the security of the United States and the free world within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system. At least for the immediate future, therefore, first priority should be given to economic analysis in support of policies relating to the conflict between the Soviet and the non-Soviet worlds. This requires intelligence relating to the capabilities, the vulnerabilities, and the intentions or

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the iron curtain not now clearly in either camp, but potentially contributing to the strength of one or the other. Also important to national security is intelligence relating to particular resources in the rest of the world, principally in Africa and Latin America, which contribute significantly to the strength of either center of power.

Studies directed at the capabilities of a country or complex of countries should be designed to reveal what limitations the economies of these countries place on what they can do, now and in the future. This relates not only to their capabilities to take military action and cold war measures, but also to their capacity to provide their populations with the rising standards of living necessary to political stability under free institutions. Vulnerability studies focus on the susceptibility of one country to the application, by another power, of selected devices designed to reduce its capabilities; in other words, how we can hurt them or they can hurt us. Studies of intentions or probable courses of action seek to present evidence which will reveal which of several alternative courses of action a country will follow.

It is tempting to divide intelligence problems into those concerned with the maintenance of the peace and the strengthening of free institutions, and those relating to the conduct of war if war should become unavoidable. This dichotomy overlooks the twin facts that policies to maintain peace must be based on the best possible intelligence as to relative military

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strength and intentions, and that the outcome of a war, should it come, will depend importantly on the stability and effectiveness of civilian economies. Hence in illuminating the major policy problems facing us, intelligence as to military capabilities must be closely blended with analyses of civilian economic development.

The framework of the outline below reflects United States security interests in the capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable courses of action of the three sets of countries noted above and in the strategic resources of the rest of the world. Within this framework are examples of reports and estimates that should be given priority treatment in the foreign economic intelligence effort.

B. Economic Analyses Relating to the USSR and its Satellites

The problem of economic intelligence relating to the iron curtain countries is a special one in several respects. Considering the present state of our knowledge, this area probably has a higher priority for additional intelligence effort than any other. There is a great need for intense effort in the collection of detailed information on this area. This collection is more difficult and costly here than elsewhere, and hence the sharp definition of priority requirements for collection is more urgent. Also the cost and difficulty of collection place a greater premium here than elsewhere on the development of special techniques to extract the maximum amount of information from the limited data obtainable. In view of the hostile intentions of the Soviet bloc, analysis of its capabilities for military and non-military aggression, its vulnerabilities, and its intentions must take priority at the moment over estimates of its capabilities

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for peaceful economic development. In general our present knowledge of certain industries and intermediate segments of the Soviet economy, while weak, is better than our knowledge of the aggregate resources and capabilities of the economies as a whole, either of the USSR proper or of the whole Soviet bloc. There is also great need for accurate knowledge of the civilian and military requirements of the economy of the Soviet orbit under conditions of "cold" and active war.

While it is recognized that Soviet control over Communist China is possibly less rigid and direct than that over the Eastern European satellites, it is believed that within the framework of this paper China should most logically be classified as a satellite.

Examples of high priority economic intelligence projects are as follows:

(1) Analysis of the economic capabilities of the USSR and its satellites to engage in military action or to employ "cold war" measures against the United States and its allies or against "neutrals"

a. Wartime Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Meet Essential Civilian and Military Requirements for Selected Critical Items (e.g., electronics equipment, copper, tin, aviation fuel, special machine tools, ferro-alloying metals, precision instruments, natural rubber, etc.)

b. Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Develop and Produce Selected Military Items (e.g., Atomic weapons, guided missiles, germ warfare agents, radar, long-range jet bombers, tanks, submarines, etc.)

c. Effect on Soviet Economic Capabilities for Prolonged War of the Acquisition by the USSR of Additional Areas, such as a) Western Europe, b) the Middle East, c) Japan, d) Southeast Asia.

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d. Overall Economic Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc as a Whole Simultaneously to Conduct Specified Military Campaigns and Maintain Essential Civilian and Military Production.

e. Effect of the Korean War Combined with Western Export Controls on the Capabilities of the Chinese Economy both With and Without Soviet Assistance.

f. Economic Capability of the European Satellites Unassisted by the USSR to Wage War on Yugoslavia. Requirements for Soviet Assistance.

g. Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to Wage Economic Warfare Against Non-Soviet Nations.

(2) Analysis of the economic vulnerability of the USSR and its satellites to measures of economic warfare, psychological warfare and to military attack, including strategic bombing.

a. Vulnerability of the Soviet and Satellite Economies, Including China's, to Strategic Bombing with Particular Reference to Their Vulnerability to A-Bomb Attack.

b. Vulnerability of the Soviet Bloc as a Whole to a Western Program of Economic Warfare. Relative Vulnerability to Various Measures - Overt and Covert.

c. Vulnerability of the Chinese Economy to Western Controls on (a) Exports to China (b) Shipping.

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d. Vulnerability of the Soviet and Satellite Economies to a Program of Induced Defection of Key Technical and Industrial Personnel.

e. Vulnerability of the Soviet and Satellite Food Supply to Biological Warfare.

(3) Analysis of economic indications of probable Soviet and satellite courses of military, and political action and analysis of all indications of probable courses of economic action.

a. Economic Activity Within the USSR and Its Satellites Which Might Reveal Their Intention to Resort to Military Action.

b. Patterns of Allocation of Economic Resources for the Production of Military Items Within the Soviet Bloc Which Might Reveal the Kind of Military Operations Contemplated.

c. Courses of Action Likely to be Taken by the USSR in Response to an Effective Western Program of Export Controls.

d. Soviet Economic Measures With Respect to China Which Might Reveal the Extent of the Political and Economic Integration of These Countries.

e. Evidence Which Might Suggest What Air Target Systems the Soviets Would be Likely to Adopt for Western Europe.

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
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D. Economic analysis relating to European and Asiatic countries not now clearly aligned with either center of power.

The countries included in this list will no doubt change from time to time, but now include at least Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Iran, India, and her neighbors, and much of Southeast Asia. Intelligence required on these countries differs from that needed on our firm allies in several ways. Firstly, much higher priority needs to be given to economic indications of the intentions of these countries. Secondly, studies of their capabilities to contribute to Soviet military strength and to assist the Western Powers are of about equal importance. Further, they are likely to be a principal battleground of ideological and economic warfare as conducted by both groups of powers. Their capabilities for economic development and our ability to influence their attitudes by assisting in this development are, therefore, of great importance. Unlike the major European allies, the economic problems of the Near Eastern and Far Eastern countries are not so much those of high employment and industrial stability and productivity as of exploitation of basic resources, organization and productivity of agriculture and promotion of public health and education.

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In general, our economic information is inadequate on these countries not because we are denied access to it, as in the case of the Soviet bloc, but because it has never been assembled by anybody to anything like the extent prevalent in Western Europe. Strategic resources are important in many of these countries, but we have a great interest in their total economic position as well as in their specific commodity and service contributions.

Examples of problems are:

(1) Analysis of the economic capabilities of "neutrals" to maintain their independence from the USSR and its satellites or to support the military and "cold war" efforts of the United States and its allies.

a. Economic Capability of Yugoslavia to Defend Itself Against Satellite Attack. Significance of a Loss of the Danubian Plain.

b. Economic Capabilities of "Neutral" Nations to Contribute to the Military Potential of the USSR.

c. Economic Importance of these Nations to the Western Defense Effort.

(2) Analysis of the capabilities of "neutrals" to maintain economic stability and to develop their economies.

a. Capability of Selected "Neutral" Countries, (e.g., Iran, India, and Yugoslavia) to Maintain Economic Stability and to Develop Their Economies. Requirements for Foreign Assistance.

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(3) Analysis of the economic vulnerability of "neutral" countries to economic, political, psychological, and military measures, with special reference to the possible influence of these measures on their alignment with and economic support for either group of powers.

a. Vulnerability of Selected "Neutral" Nations to Economic Pressure from the Soviet Bloc Designed to Force Economic Alignment With It.

b. Allied Capacity to Influence Attitudes and Allegiance of Asiatic Countries Through Economic Development Programs.

(4) Analysis of probable "neutral" courses of military, political and economic action with special reference to the extent of their alignment with and support for programs and measures affecting the security of the United States.

a. Economic Activity of "Neutral" Nations Which Reveals the Extent of Their Support for the Program of Export Controls Against the Soviet Bloc.

E. Economic analysis relating to the availability, the importance to either set of powers, and the vulnerability to interruption of the flow of specific strategic materials and services from other areas, principally Africa and Latin America.

The general economic situation in areas other than those outlined in B, C, and D above is important for many aspects of United States policy. However, the impact on our national security position of general economic

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conditions, capabilities, and intentions in such regions as Africa and Latin America is of less immediate importance than the contribution these areas make to supplies of critical raw materials needed by the Soviet Bloc and the Western Allies. The intelligence most urgently required on these areas, then, is specific details on a limited number of resources and facilities, actual and potential, rather than exhaustive coverage.

Intelligence on economic development programs and possibilities in these areas is of interest more for the effect of such programs on strategic material availabilities than for their impact on general conditions or standards of living.

The required information will normally be accessible, though some kinds of data such as that on foreign financial holdings, international corporate connections, and ultimate country of destination of shipments sometimes has to be secured covertly.

Examples of priority economic intelligence studies are:

- a. Possibilities of Expanding the Output of Selected Strategic Materials Critical to the Allied Defense Effort Through Development Programs.
- b. Organizational and Physical channels through which Critical Materials Reach the Soviet Bloc. Vulnerability of these Channels to Interruption.
- c. Possibilities of Substituting Other Sources of Strategic Materials Now Denied from (a) Western Europe (b) Southeast Asia and in the event of Loss of Either or Both These Areas to the Soviet Bloc.

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d. Probable Reaction of Countries in This Group to Economic Warfare Measures of the Allies Against the Soviet Bloc. Degree of Cooperation to be Expected.

III. Reports for Use in Support of Operations or in Implementation of Existing United States Government Plans and Policies.

A. Introduction

Agencies engaged in the implementation of certain United States government plans and policies continually require a large volume of economic intelligence reports to support their operating activities. These reports generally must contain current and detailed economic intelligence evaluated against the background of the basic studies of capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions noted in the preceding section (Section II). Agencies responsible for carrying out particular plans and policies must know which intelligence offices are primarily responsible for supplying the economic intelligence needed to support their activities. Listed below are suggestions of the kinds of economic intelligence which are required for operational purposes on either a continuing or an ad hoc basis.

B. Economic reports in support of military plans and operations

(1) Reports on the Logistical Capabilities of the USSR and Its Satellites During the Specific Operations.

(2) Reports on Strategic and Tactical Targets Within Areas Controlled by the USSR and Its Satellites During Specific Operations.

(3) Reports Relating to Logistical Support for United States and Allied Forces During Specific Operations.

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(4) Reports on Economic Conditions Bearing on the Maintenance of Law and Order and the Prevention of Disease and Unrest in Areas Under United States and Allied Military Control.

C. Economic reports in support of current United States and allied psychological and diplomatic measures to weaken the USSR and its satellites or to strengthen the allies of the United States and "neutrals".

This applies both during wartime and during the "cold war".

(1) Economic Reports to Support Voice of America

(2) Economic Reports to Support the President's Committee on Raw Materials

(3) Economic Reports in Support of Certain Diplomatic Negotiations (e.g. negotiations relating to:

a. the security of strategically important industrial operations in foreign countries;

b. a civil aviation agreement with respect to the Soviet bloc;

c. economic assistance for specific countries.)

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APPENDIX C

FACILITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS OF THE  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE  
PRODUCTION OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTELLI-  
GENCE RELATED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

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APPENDIX "C"

Part II  
(of two parts)

THE PRIMARY FOREIGN ECONOMIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN  
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES  
(1 Dec 1950)

The following statements present the primary foreign economic information activities of certain Government agencies. Indicated are the operational missions of these agencies as they pertain to foreign economic information; personnel qualifications and strength; the sources and nature of foreign economic information used; media for dissemination; and arrangements for the exchange of information among Governmental agencies and between Governmental and other agencies.

Neither the Foreign Reporting Service of the Department of State nor the Central Intelligence Agency are included. This omission is due to the fact that their respective mandates give them a prima facie interest in all categories and all areas.

The agencies whose activities are described are the same as those included in the tabulation of foreign economic interests, Appendix "C", Part I.

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